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Core Concept “Political Compass”
How Kitschelt’s Model of Liberal, Socialist, Libertarian and Conservative 
Orientations Can Fill the Ideology Gap in Civic Education
International value surveys and misconception studies reveal the crucial role of individual value orientations 
for political judgment abilities. But in Civic Education, political opinions are generally merely asked for or 
remain superficial, non-committal statements that don’t get analyzed to foster identity development, perspec-
tive-taking and tolerance. Thus, this article discusses Kitschelt’s coordinate system of political preferences as an 
outstanding solution to fill the ideology gap in Civic Education and therefore to enhance political literacy. At 
first, I will explain and outline the landscape of the four political ideologies: market-liberalism, conservatism, 
democratic socialism and left-libertarianism. In addition, I will trace left-libertarianism to its merely known 
anarchist roots. After that, I will explain how our basic political values are shaped by economic and cultural 
developments and how they combine to become political ideologies, social milieus and party families. As a 
third point, I will outline possible applications of Kitschelt’s model for the subject of Civic Education. For that, 
I propose a map of fundamental controversial issues to help students to discover their own political position. 
Finally, I will introduce the “Found-a-Village-Project” as highly interactive and controversial scenario to foster 
political identity formation.
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1. The ideology gap in Civic Education
To obtain political orientation is no simple task. Most 
American students might wonder if Obama’s health 
care policy is a socialist, a Stalinist or, as it was also 
labeled, a fascist project. German students could ask 
themselves, if the Social Democrats (SPD) became 
a right-wing party, because they cut down on wel-
fare or if the Christian Conservatives (CDU) did turn 
left, because they are about to suspend compulsory 
military service. Furthermore, students could get 
confused about market-liberals like the German Free 
Democrats (FDP) who appear politically left-winged, 
as they postulate gay marriage, but also right-winged, 
when urging lower taxes for businesses. Students 
need a dynamic core concept of political cleavages. A 
(political) compass – as it is defined as an instrument 
for finding direction – could help finding orientation 
within political movements, party programs and de-
cisions and political theories, but also when it comes 
to a better understanding of their friends’ and fami-
lies’ value orientations. This is precisely why most 
National Standards (see e.g. NCSS 2010 or GPJE 2004) 
combine their concepts with judgment abilities and 
individual identity development. Students should 
learn to distinguish between facts and opinions; 
they should understand the interactive formation of 
values and should learn to be tolerant towards dif-
ferent value orientations. Additionally, they should 
be able to analyze and solve political conflicts. But 
these standards don’t really take their own claim se-
riously. Neither American nor German programs de-
velop value systems as core concepts. Instead they 
emphasize value-neutral, “objective” thinking and 
analytical skills. The international IEA Civic Educa-
tion Study (see Torney-Purta et al. 2001) focuses on 
basic characteristics of democratic societies, like the 
willingness to vote and to participate, but also on 
democratic skills like tolerance, compromise and co-
operation. “Attitudes” are related to students’ trust 
in institutions, their country, opportunities for im-
migrants, the political rights of women, and future 
prospect. There we find indeed traces of political ide-
ology, but they are neither systematically asked for 
nor properly interpreted.
Youth surveys do normally ask for a self-placement 
on the left-right scale, but since researchers do not 
explain their understanding of these complex terms 
(e.g. Schneekloth 2010, 135) they don’t get convinc-
ing and significant answers: Instead only a few per-
cent of students dare to choose the clear left or right 
side, about 30% place themselves in the middle and 
about 20% declare not to be able to understand the 
categories well enough to place themselves properly. 
At the same time, those young people show, when 
asked about their primary values, indeed politically 
relevant ecological, religious, pacifist or private life 
orientations that are far from being apolitical. But 
they don’t understand themselves as being part of 
political cleavages because they never learned to do 
so. I call this phenomenon the Ideology gap in Civic 
Education.
A couple of classroom studies revealed a lack of ex-
posure to political conflicts (see Niemi, Niemi 2007; 
Hess, Ganzler 2007, Grammes 1998, 299-332). Neither 
do many teachers want to know political standpoints 
of their students nor do they support politically con-
troversial discussions in the classroom. Even verbally 
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open and encouraging teachers can indirectly ex-
clude certain opinions by the power of moderation, 
or simply by their comments and reinterpretations, 
or even by ignorance. The IEA study stated only 25 
per cent of students across all countries are ‘often’ 
encouraged to state their own point of view. While 
in theory many teachers favour critical thinking and 
values development, in practice they mostly deliver 
factual information using textbooks, worksheets and 
teacher talk.
Due to the absence of controversial discussions the 
students‘ own political diversity lays dormant, and 
they easily develop the misperception that „every-
body is in the middle“. Or they might believe in the 
absolute truth of their values, mislabeling dissenting 
views as assaults unworthy of proper consideration. 
The resulting fear of being misrecognized, disrespect-
ed and excluded discourages students from partici-
pating in public political discussions which they sense 
as dangerous ventures (Conover, Searing, Crewe 2002).
The competence of distinguishing and justifying 
value orientations is not a random topic among oth-
ers in Civic Education. Value orientations are psycho-
logically and culturally essential for the democratic 
development of both individuals and even whole 
societies. First, they form a developmental task, an 
important need of self-recognition and responsibility: 
„acquiring a set of values and an ethical system as a 
guide to behavior – developing an ideology“ (Havi-
ghurst 1972, 69ff.).
Second, the European Values Study and the World 
Values Survey (see Inglehart, Welzel 2005 and Welzel, 
Inglehart 2009) conveyed empirical evidence that val-
ue orientations should be regarded as the central factor 
of democratization or stagnation – both in democratic 
and non-democratic societies. However, this is only 
true, according to Inglehart and Welzel, if we measure 
and deal with real “deep-rooted civic orientations”. 
Simple preferences for democracy, as stated in most 
political surveys, are often superficial and instrumen-
tal. Answers are mainly based on social desirability and 
therefore don’t reveal anything about the motivation 
to take a stand for certain convictions. Deep-rooted civ-
ic values represent a mediating role between economic 
modernization and institutional settings.
Third, recent misconception research showed the 
crucial role of belief systems to analyze and under-
stand political facts (Nyhan, Reifler 2010). The false 
belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, 
for example remains resistant until today among 
conservative adherents of ex-president Bush. False or 
unsubstantiated beliefs can even endure corrections, 
depending on ideological orientations and partisan 
beliefs. Even worse, there are backfiring effects: Di-
rect factual contradiction frequently strengthens the 
misperception of certain ideological subgroups. 
In consequence, ideological orientations them-
selves must become central concepts of Civic Edu-
cation. It is far from being enough to understand 
how democracies work. Only the reflection of differ-
ent democratic ideologies can lead to a congruent 
world view, promote tolerance as dissociation of nar-
row views, reflecting partisanship and the ability to 
change ones perspective. Or, as Joseph Adelson (1971, 
1013) phrases it in his study „the political imagination 
of the young adolescent“: The development of a po-
litical identity as process of „struggling to formulate 
a morally coherent view of how society is and might 
and should be arranged“. 
The main thesis of my article is that the model of 
“Ultimate values, ideologies and forms of social order” 
(Kitschelt 1992, 1994, 2003), with slight modifications, 
should be considered as indispensable scaffolding for 
political literacy.
2.  The Kitschelt model and the competitive 
space of political thought
Herbert Kitschelt (1992; 1994; 2003) created his model 
as heuristics to outline the competitive space of po-
litical thought. He examined (new) party programs 
in post-communist as well as in western democra-
cies and how people’s political preference formation 
related to them. This “political universe” can be cap-
tured by the slogans of the French Revolution: liberty, 
equality, fraternity. They represent three ultimate 
values or societal end-states and are associated with 
complementary, mostly conflicting modes of social 
organization. The concepts of liberty, equality and 
fraternity vary depending on the political issue they 
are applied to. Kitschelt was one of the first theorists 
to distinguish between two cleavages that each soci-
ety has to take position on: the distributive cleavage 
about resource allocation and the communitarian/ 
socio-cultural one about actors, power and decision-
making. This is one main reason why his heuristics is 
very useful for educational purposes: Whereas cleav-
age approaches in the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) distinguish regional divisions such as center-pe-
riphery and sometimes even more than two cleavages, 
such as religious-secular, economic left-right, libertar-
ian-authoritarian and green values (see Knutsen 2009), 
Kitschelt’s approach provides clear linkages of value 
families. Since every system and political program 
must consider both dimensions at the same time, the 
form of a coordinate system seems to be the appropri-
ate type of model:
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(Kitschelt 1994, 12)
The economic or distributive axis measures possible 
opinions of how people should be endowed with re-
sources. The left “equality”-pole is defined as the view 
that assets should be redistributed by a cooperative 
collective agency (the state, in socialist tradition or a 
network of communes, in the libertarian or anarchist 
tradition). The right “liberty”-pole is defined as the 
view that the economy should be left to the market 
system, to voluntary competing individuals and orga-
nizations. This is the classical left-right-conflict that 
dominated the cold war. But here we don’t deal with a 
bipolar system-conflict, but with opposites on a con-
tinuous dimension of alternatives within democracies. 
The other axis - cross-cutting the first one - is con-
cerned with values of fraternity, understood as axi-
ological principles driving institutionalization, com-
munity, forms and actors of democracy, and the 
quality of the process of collective outcomes. This 
dimension measures possible political opinions either 
in a communitarian or procedural sense, considering 
the appropriate amount of personal freedom and 
participation: „Libertarianism“ is defined as the idea 
that personal freedom as well as voluntary and equal 
participation should be maximized. This would be the 
full realization of liberty and equality in a democratic 
sense. Parts of that view are ideas like autonomous, 
direct democratic institutions beyond state and mar-
ket, transformation of gender roles, enjoyment and 
self-determination over traditional and religious order. 
On the opposing end of the axis „authoritarianism“ 
is defined as the belief that authority and religious 
or secular traditions should be complied with. Equal 
participation and a free choice of personal behavior 
are rejected as being against human nature or against 
necessary hierarchies for a stable society. 
Each fields of the coordinate system can be linked 
to one of the four political ideologies, each of them 
combining two ultimate values. Kitschelt introduces 
“anarcho-syndicalism” as a sort of left-libertarian so-
cialism interfacing economic self-management and 
collective property with decentralist, non-hierarchical 
federalist organizations. This 
movement corresponds mostly 
with modern “post-materialist” 
and left-libertarian values – a 
fact which most other authors 
neglect, as we will see. “Libertar-
ian market capitalism” combines 
the notion of personal liberty 
with unconstrained reign of mar-
ket exchange. Here Kitschelt uses 
the American linguistic conven-
tion, to call market-liberalism 
“libertarian”. In the European context of political the-
ory we talk about “liberal”, “right-liberal” and “neo-
liberal” movements.
The integration of the two remaining ideologies is 
the weak point of his model. Since Kitschelt doesn’t 
clearly define democratic limits of the authoritarian 
pole, he equates “authoritarian socialism” with Stalin-
ism. Indeed Stalinism is an extreme form of socialism; 
nevertheless, it is not a legitimate base for democratic 
parties and preferences. Instead the center of the low-
er left corner of the coordinate system should be filled 
with the democratic socialist idea. According to this 
position, the great majority of non-owners (workers 
and employees) has the democratic right to control or 
to even annex big company owners. A strong govern-
ment representing this majority redistributes wealth 
and is also necessary to lead and enlighten those who 
are not able to identify the structural causes of exploi-
tation and injustice. This necessarily state-centered 
policy caused the historical socialist-anarchist conflict 
between Marx and Proudhon, later with Bakunin. In 
contrast to left-libertarian ideas of grassroots democ-
racy or federation, Marx and Engels already promoted 
in the Manifesto of the Communist Party the authori-
tarian (but not dictatorial) role of the party. 
The second problem of Kitschelt’s model is con-
cerned with the term “authoritarian market capital-
ism”. This ideology tries to combine political au-
thority with a free market exchange. Kitschelt (1994, 
29) explains this combination mainly with “strong 
Christian religious affiliation” that “typically teaches 
compliance with established social norms”. This sta-
tus quo orientation promotes a “defensive attitude” 
about the existing distribution of wealth. This ideol-
ogy is traditionally called “conservatism”.
Kitschelt‘s coordinate system can be seen as a re-
newal of Karl Mannheim‘s (1936) classical model of 
utopian and ideological thinking published in 1929. 
From a perspective of Sociology of Knowledge he 
identified four historical ideal types of political con-
sciousness that still influence political parties and in-
dividuals today: Orgiastic chiliasm or anarchism, liber-
alism, conservatism, and socialism. The anarchist idea, 
Fraternity with equality
and liberty: self-organized
community
Fraternity without equality and 
liberty: paternalism and corporatism
Spontaneous allocation of
resources: markets and free
exchange, capitalism
Planned
allocation of
resources: 
formal organization
with commands
or voting;
socialism
anarcho-syndicalism libertarian market
capitalism
authoritarian
market capitalism
authoritarian
socialism
Fig. 1: Ultimate values, ideologies and forms of social order
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however, is not developed historically correctly, as it 
is connected to pre-Marxist German farmer’s libera-
tion movement of the 16th century. Writing from a ten-
dentially democratic socialist perspective, Mannheim 
underestimates the future role of 19th century grass-
roots ideals as Proudhon and others developed them. 
This original error persists in many later attempts to 
classify historic political thinking.
Contemporary ideology research (Arzheimer 2009) 
gives support to the Kitschelt perspective. Two ma-
jor ideology schools can be identified: First Karl 
Mannheim’s and Robert Lane’s sociological approach 
to view ideologies as deep-rooted belief systems con-
necting a societal diagnosis with a plea for social 
changes. Second the more pragmatic view in the tra-
dition of Anthony Downs “Economic theory of democ-
racy” (1957). His main paradigm is “rational choice” 
rather than identification. The cognitive costs are 
lowered, when relevant parties can be associated with 
an ideology that encompasses the interests of certain 
social groups. Voters don’t have to be informed about 
each single issue to make their choice. Instead ideolo-
gies allow referring to political “super issues” as fun-
damental controversial questions.
There are a couple of resembling coordinate sys-
tems which are, after all, less appropriate than 
Kitschelt’s version. Arzheimer, for example proposes 
the Kitschelt model in a less exact version. Further-
more, there are four popular “political compasses” 
aiming at measuring individual political orientations: 
“The Smallest Political Quiz” (www.theadvocates.org), 
the “Political Compass” (http://politicalcompass.org), 
the “Electoral Compass” (www.electoralcompass.com) 
and the “Moral Matrix” (www.moral-politics.com). In 
the following, I will briefly summarize the typical 
classification problems which most of them share:
1.  The “left” distributive pole is sometimes labeled 
as “command economy”, a term which tradition-
ally refers to a non-democratic one-party system 
and not to a democratically organized political re-
distribution of wealth.
2.  The vertical axis gets sometimes de-politicized by 
the usage of psychological terms like “individual-
ity” and “collectivity” without directly focusing 
on communitarian issues and democratic proce-
dures. 
3.  Another coordinate system based on Inglehart’s 
value research cause confusion about the posi-
tion of German parties (Raschke 1993). There, the 
“new” Green party within the left-libertarian field 
shows the largest political difference with the 
“old” (market-)liberals (FDP), which is only true for 
the distributive dimension. On the communitarian 
dimension, Greens and right-libertarians share the 
notion of civil liberties; they oppose state obser-
vation and the restriction of free speech, they are 
more likely to tolerate social minorities etc.
4.  Mainly in US-American models, Socialism is some-
times not seen as an equitable democratic orien-
tation (as represented by European socialist and 
communist parties) but equated with dictatorial 
Stalinism. Or Socialism gets truly defined as “stat-
ist” ideology, but without labeling conservatism 
in an equal measure, ignoring that conservative 
thoughts require strong governments as well as 
the restricting of personal behavior that might 
violate traditional and religious values.
5.  It is most astonishingly that National Socialism is 
sometimes located in the lower middle, between 
the socialist and conservative field of the coordi-
nate system (Arzheimer 2009). Or, especially in the 
US-American compass versions, National Socialism 
and Socialism are regarded as rather similar or relat-
ed orientations. Although, the truly conservative 
German historian Ernst Nolte wrote down, National 
Socialism is “a clearly identifiable phenomenon of 
conservatism” (Nolte 1984). He describes it as radi-
calization process of typical conservative principles 
like nationalism, hierarchy and obedience. More-
over, National Socialism did neither expropriate big 
business nor did it redistribute wealth more equally. 
On the contrary, the National Socialists promoted a 
clearly stratified society and supported directly big 
business research and expansion interests. To treat 
National Socialism as a form of socialism perpetu-
ates simply the cynicism of this label.
6.  Anarchist or anarcho-syndicalist ideas are often 
explicitly excluded as they are seen as having de-
veloped no broad impact in most countries. This 
decision ignores the great indirect impact of par-
ticipative and grassroots anarchist values in all 
western countries since “The Silent Revolution” 
(Ingelhart 1977) through the raise of post-materi-
alist and left-libertarian values.1
The last point induces me to take a short excursion on 
anarchist thought to eliminate the popular “bomber-
image” or the prejudice of a “chaotic” society without 
rules and order. The first person who dealt with the four 
basic orientations as legitimate alternatives was prob-
ably the “father of anarchism” Proudhon himself. In his 
late work „The Principle of Federation“ (1863) he modi-
fied his earlier anti-state position and come up with a 
decentralized „theory of federal government“, calling 
it anarchy. He developed four “forms of government” 
based on “two fundamental and antithetical principles” 
that each have their own “legitimacy and morality”:
1 Kitschelt (and Flanagan similarily) criticizes Ingehart’s origi-
nal four-item materialism/post-materialism index for merely 
measuring materialist values but mainly libertarian versus au-
thoritarian values. Inglehart’s later work together with Welzel 
(2009) within the international team of the World Values Sur-
vey is more clearly focused on emancipative (libertarian) ver-
sus traditional (authoritarian) values. Welzel states explicit cor-
relations between their value research and Kitschelt’s results.
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“Regime of authority
1.  Government of all by one - monarchy or patriarchy;
2.  Government of all by all - panarchy or communism.
The essential feature of this regime, in both its variet-
ies, is the non-division of power.
Regime of liberty
1. Government of all by each - democracy;
2.  Government of each by each - an-archy or self-gov-
ernment.
The essential feature of this regime, in both its variet-
ies, is the division of power.” (Proudhon 1979, 8ff.)
At that time Proudhon opposed supporters of the 
liberal representative government (here referred to 
as democrats), Conservatives (here identified with 
monarchy and patriarchy) and Socialists alike. With 
the socialist idea he agrees on the distributive dimen-
sion since he sees capitalist and corporate property as 
“theft”. But the communitarian dimension separates 
the two egalitarian ideologies. Proudhon defines an-
archy as „the government of each by himself“, which 
means „that political functions have been reduced to 
industrial functions, and that social order arises from 
nothing but transactions and exchanges.“ Here we 
find an early concept of the modern grassroots democ-
racy. In his earlier work “Les confessions d’un révolu-
tionnaire” (1849)2 he already categorized anarchy as 
non-violent “order without leadership”:
2 Astonishingly, there is no entire English translation of this 
book.
“[…] puis mettez vous-même la main à l’oeuvre; entrepre-
nez, agissez, et ne sollicitez ni n’attaquez le Gouverne-
ment. C’est folie et injustice de batter les murailles de 
l’Autorité de votre belier démocratique et social; tour-
nez-le plutôt contre l’intertie des masses, contre le pré-
jugé gouvernemental qui arrête tout élan populaire, et 
laissez tomber, par son inutilité même, le despotisme. 
Suscitez cette action collective, sans laquelle la condi-
tion du peuple sera éternellement malheureuse, et ses 
efforts impuissants. Au lieu de pourchasser le pouvoir, 
priez-le seulement de ne se plus mêler de rien; et appre-
nez au peuple à faire lui-même, sans le secours du pou-
voir, de la richesse et de l’ordre.” (Proudhon 1849, 194)
Proudhon criticizes the “democratic and social bat-
tering ram” which the revolutionary socialist move-
ment uses to attack the government. Instead, the 
people should turn the battering ram against their 
own phlegm deriving from their prejudiced belief in 
governments, a belief that restrains their vigor. Not 
religion but this ‘government-faith’ works as ‘opium 
for the people’ (Marx). That’s why Proudhon wants 
the people to learn collective self-initiative to create 
wealth and order independently of traditional and 
new powers which shouldn’t intervene anymore. 
The probably first two-dimensional cleavage model 
including anarchism was developed as „rough-and-
ready guide to political theory“ by the two British an-
archist activists and writers Stuart Christie and Albert 
Meltzer in 1969 (Christie & Meltzer 1970, 104).
Combining the convincing parts of the different 
models and avoiding the five classification problems 
I mentioned, I am suggesting the following version:
Fig. 2:  The political compass: Four ideal-typical forms of 
democracy and their non-democratic extremes 
(Petrik 2007, 200ff.)
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Following Kitschelt, the four poles of the coordi-
nate system refer to ultimate political values. As the 
terms equality and liberty are used in many differ-
ent ways, the supplements “social” and “economic” 
seem necessary. Second, the terms “politically driven” 
versus “market-driven” economy should be added 
to make clear that the economic conflict is not only 
about redistribution but also about the role of the 
state to foster an ecological or a growth-oriented 
economic system. Self-determination is the logical op-
posite of authority in the sense of heteronomy. Self-
determination can be a collective choice so the term 
“Individualism” isn’t appropriate. Second, the term 
‘authority’ is compatible with ‘democracy’ whereas 
the term ‘totalitarianism’ (that some compasses use) isn’t. 
The concepts of self-determination and authority cover at 
the same time antithetical decentralized and hierarchi-
cal political systems, and opposed emancipative and tra-
ditional socio-cultural norms of everyday life.
The anarchist or left-libertarian idea represents a 
historical source of modern anti-authoritarian, so-
cially just, post-materialist, feminist, multicultural, 
anti-militarist and ecological grassroots politics. This 
concept of a “strong democracy” envisions neighbor-
hood assemblies, national initiatives and referendums 
on congressional legislation, experiments in work-
place democracy, and public institutions as models for 
economic alternatives. In contrast to Barbers (1984, 
68ff., 98ff.) misinterpretation, the basic anarchist idea 
based on Proudhon doesn‘t mean „anti-politics“ but 
instead “order without leadership”. At the same time 
Barbers use of the term can be understood as the un-
democratic extreme of left-libertarian thought: It can 
become purely hedonistic, conflict-denying, generat-
ing chaos and isolation through „individual self-suffi-
ciency“ whenever self-determination is detached from 
equality and collective responsibility. 
Democratic socialism consists of the idea that glob-
al and national deregulation as well as an increasing 
social inequality can only be overcome by a strong 
government, which would set new rules to control, 
reduce and occasionally expropriate big business, in 
order to redistribute incomes and to supply social 
welfare and at least a minimal income for every citi-
zen. Enlightenment against traditional religious and 
other “prejudices” is seen as the central instrument 
to abolish injustice and exploitation. Other than in 
Stalinist communism, regulations are conducted by a 
democratic government within the legal frame of the 
constitution.
The liberal idea of the invisible hand is a free market 
system that guarantees common wealth by competi-
tion without major state invention. The truly under-
stood liberalism doesn‘t distinguish between econom-
ic and personal freedom. Private life style, sexual or 
religious orientations should never become subject to 
political intervention unless it is used to harm some-
body. Private property and economic growth are the 
major sources of social, cultural and economic devel-
opment. Pushed forward to its extreme we would 
get a Manchester-Liberalism as pure capitalist market 
system without any social protection, a system auto-
matically excluding many people from political par-
ticipation.
The conservative idea is strongly rooted in Hobbes‘ 
view of Homo homini lupus („man is a wolf to [his 
fellow] man”). People need strong directives by tra-
ditional authorities to establish a peaceful, stable 
and well-ordered society. The government should 
at the same time protect individual property rights 
as well as control individual behavior in public and 
private life. Important moral values are supported 
and represented by religious authorities. The natu-
ral human inequality and destructive urges need a 
hierarchical order, in order to maintain justice and 
safety. National Socialism and Fascism represent an 
extreme form of a socially unequal, hierarchical and 
nationalist society.
Kitschelt (2003) mentions the linguistic convention 
to label the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage also 
left-right conflict, but he sticks to the convention to 
reserve the two terms to the economic dimension. I 
for myself consider two dimensions of left and right. 
Nevertheless, I will continue, for practical reasons, 
like Kitschelt does, to talk about left-libertarian and 
right-authoritarian orientations etc. Thus, these ad-
jectives clearly distinguish both dimensions.
3.  Empirical approaches to the formation 
and change of value orientations
In this chapter I will give basic insights about the 
individual and collective formation of political value 
orientation. Kitschelt proposes a micro-logical “phe-
nomenology of preference formation” within his coor-
dinate system (Kitschelt 1994, ch. 1.3 and 2003). With 
good reason, he doubts Marx‘s belief that ideologies 
emerge mainly from social classes. The Marxist view 
short-circuits the complex multi-layered process be-
tween economic property and collective action. Ac-
cording to Kitschelt, every day experiences of markets, 
work organization, and the sphere of consumption 
profoundly affect citizens‘ political aspirations and 
preferences and influence their arrangement of politi-
cal values.
Market experiences stimulate the self-attribution of 
success and failure. Hence, the location of income in 
the private or public sector becomes a crucial factor 
for the distributive dimension: People who are less 
exposed to the vagaries of international competi-
tive pressure and productivity tend to prefer politi-
cal redistribution. Private sector employees and wage 
earners in internationally competitive sectors tend to 
be opposed to redistributive policies that lower their 
profitability and capacity to invest by higher taxes. 
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Whereas domestic sector companies may compensate 
tax burdens by increasing prices to protect owners 
and workers. Here Kitschelt (2003) later adds profes-
sions in charge of the allocation of scarce resources. 
Those “wielders of authority” are more inclined to 
favor voluntary contracting that “sharpen individual 
incentives” than on centralized redistribution that 
baffles personal endeavor.
The second occupational experiences concerns peo-
ple’s control over their work environment and their 
participative opportunities. Occupations that directly 
deal with people or cultural symbols such as educa-
tion, art, communication, health care, counseling and 
social work offer autonomy and involve communica-
tive skills in non-routine work processes. They foster 
demands for social reciprocity, individual creative-
ness and open dialogue as cultural conception of iden-
tity. Collective decision-making structures undermine 
authority relations. As those occupations are rarely 
located in the international competitive sector (only 
consultants, advertising agencies, mass media) they 
tend economically to the left pole. One important in-
dicator for this group of people is education, because 
job autonomy and education are highly interrelated.
Towards the other end of the communitarian scale 
we find occupations with bureaucratic imperatives of 
costs and expediency urging employees to treat cli-
ents as standardized cases. This is the case in retail, 
finance, insurance, general public administration, po-
lice, and many legal services. A related tendency can 
be found in manufacturing, transportation, engineer-
ing design, and natural science research, where mate-
rial commodities, objects or documents are processed. 
The standardized and objectifying work structure en-
courages people to prefer social compliance and un-
ambiguous standards of behavior, to consider social 
action as monologue, adopted upon the commands 
of higher authorities. Kitschelt attributes the stron-
gest authoritarian value orientation to the “petite 
bourgeoisie” of shopkeepers, craftsmen, independent 
salespersons, and farmers.
As women are mostly employed in people-process-
ing, symbol-producing and client-interactive organiza-
tions and furthermore involved in reproductive activi-
ties claiming reciprocity, Kitschelt regards gender as 
a further indirect sign of libertarian orientations. He 
adds 2003 that women have a general preference for 
the welfare state because of their additional role as 
mother making it harder for them to invest in their 
career and making it more likely for them to fail on 
the market.
On the whole, Kitschelt identifies seven “political 
preference groups” and places them within his coor-
dinate system: 
Fig. 3: Ideology and occupational groups in advanced capitalist democracies
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1.  Group I: Low to intermediate skill administrative 
and manual public service sector (mainly in the so-
cialist quadrant)
2.  Group II: High education symbol and client pro-
cessing public service sector professionals (mainly 
in the left-libertarian quadrant)
3.  Group III: Low-skilled wage earners in domestic 
private services and manufacturing (mainly on the 
authoritarian pole with tendency to economic lib-
erty)
4.  Group IV: Trade-exposed sector of high to interme-
diate skill wage earners (the middle with slight ten-
dency to the market-liberal and the authoritarian 
pole)
5.  Group V: High skill professionals and entrepreneurs 
in the symbol producing private sector (mainly in 
the market-liberal quadrant, partly in the left-liber-
tarian quadrant)
6.  Group VI: Corporate managers, owners and profes-
sionals in business services (mainly in the conserva-
tive quadrant, partly in the market-liberal quadrant)
7.  Group VII: Small business without professional 
training, “petty bourgeoisie” (strongest market-
liberal and authoritarian tendency)
In addition to the work sphere, people’s values are af-
fected by their socio-cultural experiences which they 
gain in their leisure time. New technologies allow 
more physical and intellectual liberty. Personal styles 
of consumption and conduct become relatively inde-
pendent forces, resulting in role conflicts between 
work life, traditional family values and education. But 
since access to knowledge is still very much linked to 
social classes, role conflicts between libertarian and 
authoritarian values are less probable in lower classes.
Kitschelt’s model is far from being static. Conjunc-
tural effects, ecological catastrophes and cultural con-
flicts can lead to at least temporarily different posi-
tions. The macro-logics of economic modernization 
promote, according to Kitschelt’s own studies in 1994 
and 2003, two general value-shifts in western societ-
ies. He identified five basic “party families” which in 
the long run have to adjust their programs according 
to societal value shifts:
1.  Left-libertarian, mostly green parties (LL)
2.  Social democratic and democratic socialist resp. 
communist (labour) parties (SD)
3.  Market-liberal Parties (LIB)
4.  Christian democrat and secular conservative par-
ties (CD)
5.  (New) right-authoritarian parties (NR)
The first value shift took place from the postwar de-
cades until the 1970s and 1980s. The post-war decades 
were dominated by the cold war’s distributive conflict 
(horizontal ellipse):
Fig. 4:  Distribution of political preferences from the post-
war decades to the 1970s and 1980s 
(Kitschelt 2003, 7)
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Kitschelt has never argued, as some of his readers 
proclaim, that the libertarian-authoritarian conflict 
didn’t exist by then. This cleavage was simply less 
manifested and politically articulated. According 
to Kitschelt, the first shift towards left-libertarian 
and right-authoritarian tendencies until the 1980s 
(diagonal ellipse) had two major structural reasons: 
One reason was the decrease of manufacturing jobs 
in favor of the “post-fordist” production and new in-
formation technology that promoted a switch from 
socialist to liberal values. The decline of Stalinist 
socialism later contributed to this tendency as well. 
For another thing, the increasing financial and social 
personal services financed by a comprising welfare 
state caused a change from authoritarian to libertar-
ian values. Thus, the increasing left-libertarian, “new 
social” movements and Green parties of the 1970’s 
and 1980’s resulted in an authoritarian backlash in 
most western states via populist and nationalist 
right-wing parties. Particularly losers of economic 
modernization and less educated male workers in 
manufacturing sectors, clerks or small business own-
ers proclaimed a new authoritarianism.
The second shift increased the tendencies of the 
first shift in the direction of (right-)libertarian and 
(left-)authoritarian values (vertical ellipse):
Fig. 5: Distribution of political preferences from the 1980s to the turn of the millennium 
(Kitschelt 2003, 7)
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Until the new millennium, left-libertarian positions 
reached a “support-ceiling” because of hard budget 
restraints in the public sector due to crises of wel-
fare states. That’s why highly educated people prof-
ited mostly from the job growth within the market-
exposed sector. Consequently, left-libertarian parties 
are inclined to cautiously expand their electoral space 
towards the market-liberal segment. The decline in 
the birthrate increases the necessity of a reorienta-
tion towards rather right-libertarian young people. 
Especially the notion of intergenerational justice 
initiates left-libertarian parties to advocate retrench-
ments of pension benefits in favor of improved edu-
cation and similar tasks. Social democratic parties 
profit less and less from the working class segment 
but rally instead better educated employees, moving 
towards “economic centrism”. This in turn alienates 
their old manual working base which partly switches 
to left-authoritarian, e.g. communist parties, or right-
authoritarian ones, or they join the non-voters. Con-
servative parties with increasing pressure to liberalize 
parts of the economy and to cut down on welfare are 
endangered to lose their strengths among the elderly. 
Market-liberal parties, according to Kitschelt, are (until 
2003) the “great winners” of ongoing transformations. 
But they have to decide whether they combine their 
appeal to market-liberalism with socio-cultural liber-
tarianism or rather with more authoritarian and na-
tionalist appeals for keeping their petty-bourgeoisie 
constituencies. Radical right-winged parties tend to 
tone down their former market liberal rhetoric in fa-
vor of “welfare chauvinist” demands to limit welfare 
benefits to the indigenous population, corresponding 
to their raising success among the working class and 
clerical voters. Less educated workers are internally 
divided between social protectionists and market-
liberal tendencies.
Kitschelt couldn’t consider the financial crisis of 
2008 which is about to add a new shift from liberal 
to socialist values, as more and more people call for 
social protection, subsidies and state control of fi-
nancial and other economic transactions. In addi-
tion, the threat of global climate change could cause 
a renaissance among left-libertarian ecologists, not of 
the classical welfare state, but of public investments, 
redistribution and business control to benefit the 
ecosystem, of course with strong market-liberal back-
lashes. If these slight tendencies came true, we would 
witness a third shift of the main sphere of preference 
formation in the direction of its cold war horizon-
tal position – but with new “eco-socialist” forms of 
a politically driven economy on the left side of the 
axis. The raise of a “socio-ecological” social milieu in 
Germany, the decline of the market-liberal Free Demo-
crats’ (FDP) poll ratings combined with a real boost 
of the Green Party’s ratings may be signs for that ten-
dency (see below).
Though Kitschelt’s model has influenced many 
scholars, there is a serious critique to it (Duch, Strøm 
2004). First, the authors criticize Kitschelt’s mainly 
socio-demographic research with factors such as age, 
education, white collar/student and with personal dis-
positions such as religiosity, post-materialism, readi-
ness to join the ecological, antinuclear or peace move-
ment. Instead the authors favor using direct and 
simple questions about distributive and communitar-
ian issues, just like the European Values Study and the 
World Values Survey do. Kitschelt (1994) himself men-
tions these studies as a possible additional approach.
Apart from criticizing his methods the authors also 
question Kitschelt’s findings – even though without 
being very convincing. They misunderstand Kitschelt’s 
first value shift (see fig. 4) as rigid statement that “the 
political left is libertarian and the right authoritar-
ian“. In consequence they come up with various ex-
amples to contradict their (falsely reproduced) claim. 
For example, they show that leftist parties such as 
communists are less libertarian than rightist (market-
liberal) ones – which is evidently true, but can also 
be understood by Kitschelt’s graphics. Furthermore, 
they claim that conservative partisans also advocate 
libertarian values since their participation in “conven-
tional political acts“ is as pronounced as within the 
political left. Conventional participation, though, is 
defined as “general interest in politics, party member-
ship, lawful demonstrations, frequent political discus-
sion”. Kitschelt never suggested that left-libertarians 
were mainly striving for more conventional partici-
pation and that conservatives/ right-authoritarians 
were apolitical or generally opposed to democratic 
values. Duch and Strøm, on the other hand, find out 
that “unconventional” participation (occupying build-
ings, signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending 
unlawful demonstrations or strikes) correlates indeed 
with left-libertarian values – a fact that is completely 
compatible with the distinction between conserva-
tive and emancipative forms of participation. Finally, 
the two critics stress that the socio-cultural cleavage 
wasn’t about libertarian versus authoritarian values 
but about libertarian versus communitarian ones. 
They found communitarian concerns of “social cohe-
sion, integration and identity politics“ both within 
the economic left and right. Yet, this finding isn’t sur-
prising at all and doesn’t contradict Kitschelt’s notion 
of “fraternity, paternalism and corporatism” (see fig. 
1). The term ‘authority’ is nothing but a metaphor for 
orientations expecting individuals to adapt to a par-
ticular context. This is the case in left-winged trade 
union communities as well as in the petty bourgeoi-
sie – of course with partly different contents of their 
“identity politics”. Duch’s and Strøm’s critique misin-
terpret the value shift as if it was only a simple axis 
with a clear cut left-libertarian and right-authoritarian 
orientation. That’s why they don’t correctly reflect on 
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Kitschelt’s seven occupational groups and five party 
families with their partly common and partly contrary 
values. In fact, Kitschelt is talking about the rotation 
of the „salient space“ of preference distributions, 
which means that political parties might under cer-
tain circumstances extend their political supply with-
out completely abandoning the core of their values.
Though I mainly agree in favor of Kitschelt’s socio-
demographic research, I would like to compare it to 
approaches that are mainly based on interviews of 
individuals expressing their distributive and commu-
nitarian values. Since the European Values Study and 
the World Values Survey mainly concentrate on the 
comparison of countries I refer to the social milieu 
approach which distinguishes “value families” of like-
minded people. A social milieu is defined to combine 
a certain social status with a certain value-orientation. 
The two different schools (stemming from two former 
partners who dissociated) Sigma Mannheim (www.
sigma-online.com) and Sinus Sociovision Heidelberg 
(www.sinus-institut.de) use almost the same item-
battery and have created almost similar results. Sinus 
Sociovision has created seven meta-milieus based on 
empirical surveys of most important Western coun-
tries and China (see Sinus Sociovision 2005, 2009; 
Hradil 2006). Below I outline their descriptions, add-
ing differentiations according to the Sigma model for 
Germany (Ascheberg 2006) and the new 2010 Sinus 
model for Germany (www.sinus-institut.de/en):
1.  Traditional: Security, status quo, tradition, duty, 
discipline and order. The Kitschelt- and the German 
Sigma-model distinguish here two traditional mi-
lieus: the right-wing “petit bourgeoisie” or tradi-
tional lower middle-class and the left-wing trade-
union-oriented, tradition-bound worker’s milieu.
2.  Established: Commitment to achievement, claim to 
leadership, status awareness, requirement of exclu-
sivity, conservative attitude.
3.  Intellectual: Open mindedness, post-materialist 
ecological and participative values, pronounced 
cultural and intellectual interests, striving for self-
actualization and self-development.
4.  Modern mainstream: Enjoyable and harmonious life, 
aspiration for material and social security, family. 
Here the Sigma model for Germany distinguishes 
a modern moderately conservative middle-class 
milieu from a slightly less traditional and more 
libertarian milieu of employees in the high-tech and 
service sector. The newest sinus model for Ger-
many 2010 distinguishes the (more conservative) 
“mainstream middle class” from a “socio-ecological 
milieu” of political correctness and globalization 
critics.
5.  Consumer-materialistic: Will to stick with the main-
stream consumer standards, but often disadvan-
taged and disrooted precarious people.
6.  Sensation orientated: Search for fun and action, 
new intensive experiences, life in the here and now, 
spontaneity and individualism, provocation and 
unconventionality. In the Sigma model referred to 
as hedonistic milieu, the newest Sinus model talks 
about the “escapist milieu”.
7.  Modern performers: Young, flexible, mobile, suc-
cess- and action-orientated, highly qualified, com-
mitted, motivated, fascinated by multi-media. 
Here the Sigma model distinguishes well-edu-
cated urban postmodern performers from (partly 
more conservative) high achievers in highly com-
petitive sectors stemming mostly from the lower 
middle-class.
If we take these seven Meta-Milieus and the distinc-
tions following the German models we get eleven pos-
sible milieus and therefore a slightly more differenti-
ated but rather similar group formation than Kitschelt 
(see fig. 3). We can place the eleven Milieus within the 
political compass to identify their potential basic ori-
entation. The postmodern and the hedonistic milieu, 
going beyond Kitschelt’s groups, represent proto-
types of the idealistic and self-experimental parts of 
post-materialist thinking:
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Neither Kitschelt nor the Milieu approach claim a sim-
ple connection between (often times latent) ideologi-
cal preferences and voting. Many other factors such as 
the current personal and political situation, personali-
ties of politicians, mass media and party propaganda 
shape one’s actual party choice. The individual value 
preference mainly reveals the political identity as an 
important base for critical judgment. 
Whereas the milieu-approach refers to politically 
significant values, the explicitly opposed “life-style”-
approach (Dziemba, Pock, Steinle 2007) is an example 
of extreme de-politicization. Instead of the “fixed life 
patterns” that the so-called future researchers see with-
in the milieu approach, their own research diagnoses 
mostly transitory lifestyles. Value types such as Com-
muniTeens, Latte Macchiato-Families, Super-Daddies, 
Tiger-Ladies and Greyhoppers lack in deep-rooted and 
therefore perennial values, all the above-discussed 
surveys are striving for. Moreover, the life style survey 
is obviously restricted to left-libertarian, market-liber-
al and modern conservative groups of people, ignor-
ing losers of modernization who feel the necessity of 
an authoritarian backlash.
4.  Closing the ideology gap in Civic 
Education: Individual positioning 
taught through fundamental issues 
and controversial debates
In this last chapter I will outline how teachers can 
use Kitschelt’s model in the civic education classroom. 
It can become a basic tool to sharpen the student’s 
political orientation by contrasting and analyzing ide-
ologies, party platforms, social milieus, social move-
ments, newspaper comments, textbook articles and 
so on. Second, it can be used to locate and develop 
individual political preferences. If we consider the 
axes as vectors, each individual can be represented 
by an average position showing the relative impact of 
ultimate political values and related issues. The four 
political compasses (see above) and the European 
Values Study as well as the World Values Survey each 
work with highly controversial questions that cause 
people to position themselves. Exemplarily, I would 
like to introduce the “smallest political quiz” as the 
simplest variation of all compasses in order to dem-
onstrate their basic functioning. According to its ex-
plicitly right-libertarian authors, the quiz is used in 
many American schools and Civics textbooks (as to 
the imprecise term “statist” see chapter 2):
Fig. 6:  Potential connection between social milieus and political value orientation
 
 
 
 
Modern performers 
Self-determination
Emancipative association
Decentralized system
Authority
Traditional order
Hierarchical System
Social equality
Politically driven economy
& resource allocation
Economic liberty
Market-driven economy
& resource allocation
Post-
modern
milieu
Liberal
intellectuals Hedo-
nistic
milieu
High achievers
Modern
middle-class
Modern
employees
(partly “socio-
ecological”)
Established
conservative
milieuTraditional
workers
Con-
sumer
mate-
ria-
listic
Traditional
“petite bourgeoisie”
(lower middle-class)
(Petrik 2007)
Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education 
Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62
57
Fig. 7: The World‘s Smallest Political Quiz
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You can find your own place in the chart by answering 
the following ten questions positively, negatively or 
indifferently (the latter risking of putting you into the 
center). Of course, the ID-question is only controver-
sial in an US-American context; it would be consensual 
in Europe. The total of points for each answer shows 
an average political position:
 PERSONAL ISSUES
1.  Government should not censor speech, press, me-
dia or the Internet.
2.  Military service should be voluntary. There should 
be no draft.
3.  There should be no laws regarding sex between 
consenting adults.
4.  Repeal laws prohibiting adult possession and use 
of drugs.
5.  There should be no National ID card.
 
 ECONOMIC ISSUES
1.  End “corporate welfare.” No government handouts 
to business.
2.  End government barriers to international free 
trade.
3.  Let people control their own retirement: privatize 
Social Security.
4.  Replace government welfare with private charity.
5.  Cut taxes and government spending by 50% or 
more.
At schools, political compasses are mostly used to 
help students to identify parties matching with their 
personal values. The “Electoral Compass” (www.elec-
toralcompass.com), being the most scientific of the 
four, has been built for the US-presidential elections 
of 2008. It derived from the Kieskompas that schol-
ars of the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam created in 
1985 (http://www.kieskompas.nl/). Kieskompas was 
constructed as an alternative to the popular Stemwi-
jzer voting adviser that has for his part influenced the 
German voting adviser “Wahl-O-Mat”. Unfortunately, 
Stemwijzer and Wahl-O-Mat don’t enable voters to 
determine their position within in the whole politi-
cal landscape so that I would suggest replacing those 
models by the Kieskompas or by Kitschelt’s model. 
If we compare the questionnaires of the four com-
passes, including items of the European Values Study 
and the World Values Survey which are related to the 
distributive and the communitarian cleavage, we get 
a basic list of fundamentally controversial political 
questions:
1.  Which persons and agencies should be in charge of 
decision-making and government?
2.  How do we solve national and international con-
flicts and breaches of the rules?
3.  What is the value base of our society? Which role 
should religion play?
4.  How should we include strangers and social minori-
ties in the mainstream culture?
5.  How should politics influence private life styles, 
gender relations and sexual behavior?
6.  What impact should the state have on economy 
and property rights?
7.  How should people get endowed with resources?
8.  Which are the leading economic principles and 
how do they impact on the educational system?
9.  What role should ecology play for the economic 
system?
These questions represent a political key concept 
helping teachers to choose controversial topics that 
foster political judgment skills. The following table 
compares the essential controversial issues that the 
different approaches use:3
3 From the European and the World Values Survey, I mainly cho-
se similar basic items for the two political dimensions (for a 
similar selection and differences between both questionnaires 
see Knutsen 2009, appendix). The whole item sets are available 
on the surveys’ internet sites.
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Fig. 8: Highly controversial issues used in questionnaires on individual value orientation
Fundamental issues
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1.  Decision making & 
government
Independence and 
deliberation vs. obe-
dience in family and 
work, men’s leader-
ship, participation
Question au-
thorities; one-party 
state; obeying and 
commanding
2.  Conflict resolution 
and security
Strong Defense, 
fighting crime, free-
dom of speech
Military service, 
censorship
Spank children, 
discipline, death 
penalty, rehabilita-
tion, military action, 
civil rights and 
counter-terrorism
Gun control, Irak 
invasion; financial 
contribution to 
UN, Iran and world 
peace; Patriot act 
and civil liberties, 
defense spendings, 
death penalty, tor-
ture and security
Strong security & 
defense; respect of 
law versus causes of 
crime
3.  (Non-) religious 
value base
Role of faith (God, 
Hell, Sin, Heaven…)
Religion in school, 
religion and moral-
ity
Creationism in sci-
ence classes, stem 
cell research
God’s existence & 
significance
4.  Inclusion and 
cultural identity
Immigration; inte-
gration; strangers 
as neighbors
National ID card
Nationalism, race 
superiority, integra-
tion
UN, legalization of 
illegal immigrants
Patriotism, ethnic 
groups
5.  Private life styles
Gender equality, 
drug abuse, homo-
sexuality, abortion, 
imagination
Sexuality, use of 
drugs
Drug legalization, 
reproduction, gen-
der roles, (same-sex) 
marriage, same-sex 
child adoption
Same-sex marriage, 
abortion
Equality of sexes, 
traditional & non-
traditional life 
styles
6.  Property rights 
and economic 
leadership
Private vs. govern-
ment ownership
International free 
trade, government 
spendings
Corporate interests, 
privatization
Control of mort-
gage lenders, more 
public funding to 
public schools
Business benefit
7.  Resource allocation 
and redistribution
Private vs. state 
responsibility; more 
equal vs. more 
different incomes; 
stable prices
Corporate welfare, 
private social 
security & charity; 
flat tax
Class division, wel-
fare, charity
Tax raises vs. tax 
cuts for higher 
incomes, private 
retirement fund, 
medicare benefits, 
reduction of income 
equality, obligatory 
health care
Private or state-
provided health 
care, charity
8. Economic prin-
ciples and educa-
tional system
Competition fosters 
creativity vs. fos-
ters bad features
Compulsory class-
room attendance, 
job preparation as 
major aim of educa-
tion
Higher wages for 
better teachers
Elite or equal educa-
tion
9. Ecology and 
economy
Increased taxes, 
higher prices and/
or less economic 
growth or jobs to 
protect environ-
ment
Regulations for 
environment protec-
tion
Exaggerated effects 
of global warming; 
carbon tax; climate 
change policies 
versus economic 
growth
Nature protection 
or exploitation
On the basis of these nine fundamental topics we can 
now specify the ultimate values of the Kitschelt-com-
pass. The following version opens up the landscape 
of political controversy within democratic societies. 
The grey fields represent the corporate values of two 
adjacent ideologies while on the contrary the white 
ones refer mainly to one ideology that typically fills 
one quadrant (see fig. 2). This political map allows us 
at the same time to consider the possibilities of coali-
tions and the contrasts between two ideologies shar-
ing one ultimate value like authority, social equality, 
economic liberty or self-determination. It represents 
the important “value-bricks” of political ideology:
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Finally, I would like to summarize my “Found-a-Vil-
lage-Project” (Petrik 2007; 2008; 2011). Its basic idea 
follows Adelson’s (1971) island-scenario as a frame-
work for political identity development. The inter-
viewed adolescents were asked to imagine a thousand 
people venture to an island to form a new society. 
Adelson then presented hypothetical laws and po-
tential conflicts within the community to the youth. 
Should a law be passed to prohibit smoking? Should 
a dissenting religious group be vaccinated? Beyond 
that, my simulation of a deserted Pyrenees mountain 
village offers a more concrete institutional setting 
with traces of the traditional class structure, as well 
as a market place, a town hall, a prison and a church. 
Those institutions animate students more likely to de-
bate basic political issues than the “naturalist” island. 
In each of the three acts, Kitschelt’s model plays an 
indirect or direct role:
Act one: “Discovery of controversial values”: The 
students get together for several town meetings to 
develop their own economic, political and cultural 
system. Those meetings are mostly highly controver-
sial, inducing the students to establish basic debat-
ing rules. Some of the fundamental issues such as 
decision-making and the distribution of incomes are 
raised automatically, without the teacher having to 
introduce them (genetic approach in the tradition of 
Dewey and Wagenschein). Later the teacher confronts 
the students with potential village situations that sys-
tematically launch the nine fundamental issues (see 
fig. 8 and 9).
1.  Government: Should we elect a strong leader to 
solve personal conflicts and our economical crisis?
2.  Conflict resolution: What should we do with a vil-
lager who stole 1000 € out of the common cash 
box?
3.  Value base: Might we transform the church into a 
secular cultural center?
4.  Inclusion: Should we accommodate four tradition-
al Moslems from Algeria?
5.  Private life: Who should decide about a village 
girl’s request to have an abortion?
6.  Property rights: Do we accept an investor’s offer to 
buy one of the houses, transforming it into a hotel, 
building a road out of the small path, a parking on 
the market place, a telephone and internet line to 
attract more tourists?
7.  Redistribution: Should the whole village pay for 
the reparation of the rotten roof of one of the 
houses?
8.  Economic principles: Should villagers who are 
economically successful by inventing new cultiva-
Fig. 9: The core curriculum of controversial distributive and socio-cultural values
Economic 
liberty 
Political 
regulation 
Free religious competition, agnosticism 
1. Grassroots democracy, unanimous vote 
Violence & military intervention as ultimate ratio 
3. Secular norms, state influence 
Self-determination 
Authority 
Federalist representative system, major vote 
2. Civil disobedience, pacifism, antimilitarism Negotiation, resocialization 
3. Atheism, free spirituality Free competition of non-binding belief-systems 
Decentralization, pluralism, multiculturalism, integration 
Centralization, assimilation Guiding culture, national & ethnocentric identity 
Non-patriarchic family, lifestyle pluralism 5. Elective affinity, free love, living community, gay rights Role emancipation, sexual freedom 
Politically 
directed 
economy  
Private 
initiative & 
investments, 
individual 
ownership & 
responsibility 
Political 
redistri-
bution 
mutualism 
7. Uncondi-
tional basic 
income or 
common 
property 
Welfare, high 
taxes 
guaranteed 
income 
State 
ownership & 
respon-
sibility 
6. Collective 
ownership, 
autogestion 
8. Motiva-
tion through 
cooperation 
& satisfac-
tion of 
needs; 
comprehen-
sive edu-
cation 
system 
Growth as 
prime 
economic 
goal 
9. Sustaina-
bility as 
prime eco-
nomic goal 
6. Competitive 
middle class 
companies 
Powerful 
major 
corporations 
Market-
driven re-
source allo-
cation; mi-
nimal taxes 
& welfare  
8.Motivation 
through 
competition, 
achieve-
ment & 
merit, tiered 
education 
system 
9. Growth & 
profit as 
prime eco-
nomic goal 
Social 
equality as 
prime eco-
nomic goal 
Charity & 
workfare; 
compulsion 
to work 
7. Equal 
opportuni-
ties; materi-
al incentive 
Participation 
1. Hierarchical decision-making, elite- and expert-democracy 
2. Power as a means to solve conflicts; deterrence & punishment; army as peacekeeper & preserver of values 
Religious believes, church & state influence Binding value system 
4. Guiding social policies, internationalist identity 
Traditional gender role expectation Marriage & family as core of society 5. Emancipatory gender role expectation 
Moral limits, 
integrity of 
creation, 
homeland 
protection 
Immigration mainly for economic usefulness 4. Immigration mainly as human right 
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tion methods, computer games etc. pay a special 
wealth tax?
9.  Ecology: Do we want to invest in a wind powered 
generation and ecological farming by neglecting 
other possible investments?
Act two: “From values to ideologies”: Now the village 
inhabitants get to know the four founding fathers 
of liberalism, conservatism, socialism and anarchism 
(term used as an equivalent to left-libertarianism, see 
above) Smith, Burke, Marx and Proudhon by original 
text passages. The students engage in role-plays (how 
would a liberal, socialist etc. village look like?) in order 
to learn to perform their different argumentation pat-
terns. Later they work on developing a political com-
pass integrating the four ideologies. Afterwards they 
compare their own solutions with Kitschelt’s model.
Act three: “From ideologies to current politics”: Final-
ly, the villagers discuss controversial macro-political 
questions, like homosexual marriage, national refer-
endums, climate change or the decline of the welfare 
state. First, by taking the four ideological perspec-
tives in a role discussion and second, by stating their 
own point of views. So they pass through a learning 
path from the discovery of their proper values to po-
litical ideologies, systems and recent political issues.
I am currently using the village scenario to do case 
studies on “politicization types” as heuristics to deal 
with differently motivated political learning prob-
lems. A politicization type shows a typical argumen-
tative and conflict resolution behavior depending on 
his or her basic political value orientation: An example 
might be latent conservative student who refuses to 
justify her/his claims since he/she views them as “nat-
ural” or a latent left-libertarian student who insults 
“dissident” villagers because of their unexpected op-
position to egalitarian policies (see Petrik 2010).
Conclusions
Following the „Pragmatologic Theory of Models“ (Sta-
chowiak 1973) Kitschelt’s model appears to be a func-
tional combination between overly simple and very 
complex alternatives. The one-dimensional left-right 
scale has always been insufficient, as it couldn’t clar-
ify, for example, the differences between an authori-
tarian and a libertarian left orientation. Furthermore, 
the ambiguous nature of (market-)liberalism between 
his “left-wing” civil rights orientation and his “right-
wing” distributive position wasn’t explained cor-
rectly. A three- or four-dimensional model would be 
less practical and less “dynamical”. Second, it is not 
by accident that many scholars and publicists have 
chosen almost exactly the same coordinate system – 
most of the times without knowing each other. Every 
political system needs to deal with decision-making 
and conflict resolution, the creation and distribution 
of wealth, religion, life styles and value change and in-
clusion of outsiders. These fundamental topics can be 
modeled by two dimensions in so far as most individ-
uals, movements and parties seek a certain “average” 
congruence between their different communitarian 
and distributive insights. Supporters of authoritarian 
governments, for example, very rarely promote anti-
authoritarian education.
By and large, Kitschelt’s model is a good example 
of what the ‘Psychology of Concepts’ calls the “proto-
type view” Murphy 2002, 488ff.): Here ideologies are 
not “classically” perceived as precise definitions but as 
variable concepts with strong “family resemblance”. 
Prototypes like socialism or liberalism are summary 
representations of an entire category that overlap 
with other members of the category, without having 
attributes that all members (individuals, movements, 
parties) share. The resulting flexible operationality is 
the major outcome of this model:
Ideologies can be contrasted and related. Hybrids 
can be mapped as well, see social democracy, social 
liberalism, Christian democracy or socialist and con-
servative variations of Communitarianism. Especially 
the New Social and Green movements can be seen in 
a left-libertarian and non-violent anarchist tradition. 
Fascism and Stalinism get contoured as two economi-
cally quite different, but at the same time similarly 
totalitarian extremes.
New political parties and movements can be asked 
for their special value cocktail. Possible coalitions be-
tween parties or movements can be proved regarding 
their ideological chances. Single political problems 
like unemployment can be compared for contrasting 
scientific and political solutions (see Hippe 2010). 
The model helps relating every day values, social 
milieus and latent political orientations. Collective 
values shifts and backlashes can be traced. Contradic-
tions between party platforms and actual political de-
cisions can be mapped and explained as well.
Individual orientations can be located, even when 
dealing with incongruent “patchwork-identities” such 
as a religious socialist. An actual individual position 
represents an average, summary spot. The value de-
viations caused by special topics can be mapped as 
well. Students can learn to better articulate or alter 
their position and at the same time better understand 
their political counterparts as well as political parties 
and movements (see the top of this article).
Civic education teachers can use the model to test 
and widen their material’s controversy. At the same 
time, they can assist their students to develop a toler-
ant and self-reflected political identity such as in the 
“Found-a-Village”-Project.
Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education 
Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62
61
References
Adelson, Joseph. 1971. The Political Imagination of the 
Young Adolescent. In: Daedalus, 100, 1013-1050.
Ascheberg, Carsten. 2006. Milieuforschung und Transnatio-
nales Zielgruppenmarketing. [Milieu Research and Transna-
tional Target Group Marketing]. In: Aus Politik und Zeitge-
schichte, Vol. 44-45, 18-25. 
Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. Ideologien. In Kaina, Viktoria; Röm-
mele, Andrea, eds. 2009. Politische Soziologie. Ein Studien-
buch. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 83-108.
Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong Democracy. Participatory 
Politics For a New Age. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: Uni-
versity of California Press.
Christie, Stuart; Meltzer, Albert. 1970. The Floodgates of 
Anarchy. London: Kahn & Averill.
Conover, Pamela J.; Searing, Donald D; Crewe, Ivor M. 2002. 
The Deliberative Potential of Political Discussion. In: British 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, 21-62.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. 
Harper & Brothers, New York.
Dziemba, Oliver; Pock, Benny; Steinle, Andreas. 2007. Leb-
ensstile 2020. Eine Typologie für Gesellschaft, Konsum und 
Marketing. [Life Styles. A Typology for Society, Consump-
tion and Marketing]. Zukunftsinstitut.
Duch, Raymond M.; Strøm, Kaare. 2004. Liberty, Authority, 
and the New Politics: A Reconsideration. Journal of Theo-
retical Politics, Vol. 16(3), 233-262.
GPJE, ed. 2004. Nationale Bildungsstandards für den Fac-
hunterricht in der politischen Bildung an Schulen. [National 
Educational Standards for Civic Education in Schools] 
Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau.
Grammes, Tilman. 1998. Kommunikative Fachdidaktik. 
Politik – Geschichte – Recht – Wirtschaft. [Communicative 
Subject Didactics. Politics – History – Law – Economy]. Op-
laden: Leske+Budrich.
Havighurst, Robert J. 1972. Developmental Tasks and Edu-
cation. New York: McKay.
Hess, Diana; Ganzler, Louis. 2007. Patriotism and Ideologi-
cal Diversity in the Classroom. In Westheimer, Joel, ed.: 
Pledging Allegiance: The Politics of Patriotism in America‘s 
Schools. New York: Teachers College Press, 131-138.
Hippe, Thorsten. 2010. Wie ist sozialwissenschaftliche Bil-
dung möglich? Gesellschaftliche Schlüsselprobleme als in-
tegrativer Gegenstand der ökonomischen und politischen 
Bildung. [How Can Social Studies Education Be Done? So-
cial Key Problems as Integrative Subject for Economical and 
Political Education]. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
Hradil, Stefan. 2006. Soziale Milieus – eine praxisorientierte 
Forschungspraxis. [Social Milieus - a Practice-Oriented Re-
search Practice]. In: APuZ, 44-45.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing 
Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princ-
eton University Press. 
Inglehart, Ronald; Welzel, Christian. 2005. Modernization, 
Cultural Change and Democracy. New York, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1992. The Formation of Party Systems in 
East Central Europe. In: Politics & Society, 20, 1, 7-50.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European 
Social Democracy. Cambridge (U.K.)/New York/Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2003. Diversification and Reconfigura-
tion of Party Systems in Postindustrial Democracies, Fried-
rich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn. (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
id/02608.pdf)
Knutsen, Oddbjørn. 2009. Regions, Social Structure and 
Value Orientations. A Comparative Study of 15 West Euro-
pean Countries. In European Political Science Review, Vol. 
1 (3), 401-434.
Lipset, Seymor M.; Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems and 
Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: 
The Free Press.
Mannheim, Karl. 1936. Ideology and Utopia. An Introduc-
tion to the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul.
Murphy, Gregory L. 2002. The Big Book of Concepts. Cam-
bridge: MIT.
National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS). 2010. Na-
tional Curriculum Standards for Social Studies: A Frame-
work for Teaching, Learning, and Assessment. Silver Spring, 
MD: NCSS. (www.socialstudies.org)
Niemi, Nancy S.; Niemi, Richard G. 2007. Partisanship, Par-
ticipation, and Political Trust as Taught (or not) in High 
School History and Government Classes. Theory and Re-
search in Social Education, Vol. 35 (1), 32-61. 
Nolte, Ernst. 1984. Konservativismus und Nationalsozial-
ismus. In: Schumann, Hans-Gerd, ed. Konservativismus. 
Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum, 244-261.
Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education 
Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62
62
Nyhan, Brendan; Reifler, Jason. 2010. When Corrections Fail: 
The Persistence of Political Misperceptions. In Polit Behav, 
Vol. 32, 303-330.
Petrik, Andreas. 2007. Von den Schwierigkeiten, ein poli-
tischer Mensch zu werden. Konzept und Praxis einer gene-
tischen Politikdidaktik. [On the Difficulties of Becoming a 
Political Human Being. Conception and Practice of the Ge-
netic Approach in Civic Education]. Opladen/Farmington 
Hills: Barbara Budrich.
Petrik, Andreas. 2008. Being and Becoming Political in 
the Classroom. The „Found- a-Village-Project“ as Ge-
netic Teaching and Research Setting. Paper presented 
at the German-American Conference “The future of civic 
education” in Montpelier, Virginia in September 26, 2008. 
(http://www.civiced.org/pdfs/GermanAmericanConf2009/
Petrik_political_classroom.pdf)
Petrik, Andreas. 2010. Politisierungstypen im Lehrstück 
„Dorfgründung“. Eine Bildungsgangstudie zur Entwicklung 
der Urteils- und Konfliktlösungskompetenz im Politikunter-
richt. [Politicization Types within the „Found- a-Village-
Project“. In: Bayrhuber, Horst et al., eds. Empirische Fund-
ierung in den Fachdidaktiken. Fachdidaktische Forschungen 
[Empirical Foundation of Subject Matter Didactics], Bd. 1. 
Münster et al.: Waxmann, 159-184.
Petrik, Andreas. 2011. Regiebuch zum Lehrstück Dorfgründ-
ung. Eine praxiserprobte Simulation zur Einführung in das 
demokratische System, politische Theorien, Debattieren 
und Urteilsbildung. [Promptbook of the ‚Found-a-Village-
Project.’ A Field-tested Introduction to Democracy, Politi-
cal Theory, Debating and Judgment Abilities.]Für Sek. I u. 
Sek. II. Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau.
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph. 1979. The Principle of Federation. 
And the Need to Reconstitute the Party of Revolution. To-
ronto et al: University of Toronto Press.
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1849. Les confessions d’un révolu-
tionnaire pour servir à l’histoire de la Révolution de février. 
Ixelles lez Bruxelles.
Torney-Purta, Judith; Schwille, John; Amadeo, Jo-Ann, eds. 
1999. Civic Education across Countries. Twenty-four Na-
tional Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project. 
Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement.
Raschke, Joachim. 1993. Die Grünen. Wie sie wurden, was 
sie sind. [The Greens. How they Developed, What They Are 
Now]. Köln: Bund-Verl.
Schneekloth, Ulrich. 2010. Jugend und Politik: Aktuelle 
Entwicklungstrends und Perspektiven. [Youth and Politics. 
Recent Trends and Perspectives]. In: Shell Deutschland 
Holding, Hg. Jugend 2010. Eine pragmatische Generation 
behauptet sich. Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 129-164.
Sinus Sociovision, Hg. 2005. Die Sinus-Milieus in Deutsch-
land, Österreich und der Schweiz. Hintergrund, Ergebnisse, 
Anwendung. Heidelberg: Sinus Sociovision. (www.sinus-
institut.de/uploads/tx_mpdownloadcenter/Micro-Market-
ing_forum_2005.pdf) 2.10.2010.
Sinus Sociovision, Hg. 2009. Informationen zu den Sinus-
Milieus 2009. Heidelberg: Sinus Sociovision. (http://www.
sinus-institut.de/uploads/tx_mpdownloadcenter/informa-
tionen_2009_01.pdf)
Stachowiak, Herbert. 1973. Allgemeine Modelltheorie. 
Wien: Springer.
Welzel, Christian; Inglehart, Ronald. 2009. Political Culture, 
Mass Beliefs, and Value Change. In Haerpfer, Christian W., 
ed. Democratization. Oxford: University Press, 126-144.
